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(a) Live (b) Print (c) Replay (d) Half Mask (e) Silicone Mask (f) Transparent (g) Paper Mask
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Fig. 1. Example spoof attacks: Simple attacks include (b) printed photograph, or (c) replaying the victim’s video More advanced spoofs can also be leveraged
such as (d-h) 3D masks, (i-k) make-up attacks, or (l-n) partial attacks [1]. A live face is shown in (a) for comparison. Here, the spoofs in (b-c, k-n) belong
to the same person in (a).
Abstract—State-of-the-art spoof detection methods tend to
overfit to the spoof types seen during training and fail to
generalize to unknown spoof types. Given that face anti-spoofing
is inherently a local task, we propose a face anti-spoofing
framework, namely Self-Supervised Regional Fully Convolutional
Network (SSR-FCN), that is trained to learn local discriminative
cues from a face image in a self-supervised manner. The proposed
framework improves generalizability while maintaining the com-
putational efficiency of holistic face anti-spoofing approaches (<
4 ms on a Nvidia GTX 1080Ti GPU). The proposed method is
interpretable since it localizes which parts of the face are labeled
as spoofs. Experimental results show that SSR-FCN can achieve
TDR = 65% @ 2.0% FDR when evaluated on a dataset com-
prising of 13 different spoof types under unknown attacks while
achieving competitive performances under standard benchmark
datasets (Oulu-NPU, CASIA-MFSD, and Replay-Attack).
Index Terms—Face anti-spoofing, spoof detection, regional
supervision, fully convolutional neural network
I. INTRODUCTION
THE accuracy, usability, and touchless acquisition of state-of-the-art automated face recognition systems (AFR)
have led to their ubiquitous adoption in a plethora of domains,
including mobile phone unlock, access control systems, and
payment services. The adoption of deep learning models
over the past decade has led to prevailing AFR systems
with accuracies as high as 99% True Accept Rate at 0.1%
False Accept Rate [2]. Despite this impressive recognition
D. Deb and A. K. Jain are with the Department of Computer Science and
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performance, current AFR systems remain vulnerable to the
growing threat of spoofs1.
Face spoofs are “fake faces” which can be constructed
with a variety of different materials, e.g., 3D printed masks,
printed paper, or digital devices (video replay attacks from
a mobile phone) with a goal of enabling a hacker to im-
personate a victim’s identity, or alternatively, obfuscate their
own identity (see Figure 1). With the rapid proliferation of
face images/videos on the Internet (especially on social media
websites, such as Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn), replaying
videos containing the victim’s face or presenting a printed
photograph of the victim to the AFR system is a trivial
task [6]. Even if a face spoof detection system could trivially
detect printed photographs and replay video attacks (e.g., with
depth sensors), attackers can still attempt to launch more
sophisticated attacks such as 3D masks [7], make-up, or even
virtual reality [8].
The need for preventing face spoofs is becoming increas-
ingly urgent due to the user’s privacy concerns associated
with spoofed systems. Consider for example, United States
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the largest federal law
enforcement agency in the United States, which daily (i) pro-
cesses entry to the country for over a million passengers and
pedestrians [9] and (ii) employs automated face recognition as
the primary biometric for person verification and search [10].
Failure to detect spoofs can be a major security threat as the
1ISO standard IEC 30107-1:2016(E) defines spoofs as “presentation to
the biometric data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering with
the operation of the biometric system” [3]. Note that these spoofs are
different from digital manipulation of face images, such as DeepFakes [4]
and adversarial faces [5].
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Fig. 2. An overview of the proposed Self-Supervised Regional Fully Convolution Network (SSR-FCN). We train in two stages: (1) Stage 1 learns global
discriminative cues via training on the entire face image. The score map obtained from stage 1 is hard-gated to obtain spoof regions in the face image. We
randomly crop arbitrary-size patches from the spoof regions and fine-tune our network in stage 2 to learn local discriminative cues. During test, we input the
entire face image to obtain the classification score. The score map can also be used to visualize the spoof regions in the input image.
primary goal of CBP is to prevent entry to people posing a
security risk to the United States [11]. Also consider that, with
the advent of Apple’s iPhone X and Samsung’s Galaxy S8, all
of us are carrying automated face recognition systems in our
pockets embedded in our smartphones. Face recognition on
our phones facilitates (i) unlocking the device, (ii) conducting
financial transactions, and (iii) access to privileged content
stored on the device. Failure to detect spoof attacks on
smartphones could compromise confidential information such
as emails, banking records, social media content, and personal
photos [12].
With numerous approaches proposed to detect face spoofs,
current face anti-spoofing methods have following shortcom-
ings:
a) Generalizabilty: Since the exact type of spoof attack
may not be known beforehand, how to generalize well to
“unknown”2 attacks is of utmost importance. A majority of the
prevailing state-of-the-art face anti-spoofing techniques focus
2We make a distinction between unseen and unknown attack types. Unseen
attacks are spoof types that are known to the developers whereby algorithms
can be specifically tailored to detect them, but their data is never used
for training. Unknown attacks are spoof types that are not known to the
developers and neither seen during training. In this paper, we focus on the
more challenging scenario of unknown attacks.
3TABLE I
A SUMMARY OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE FACE ANTI-SPOOFING DATASETS.
Dataset Year Statistics PIE Variations # Spoof Types Total
# Subj. # Vids. Pose Expression Change Illumination Change Replay Print 3D Mask Makeup Partial
Replay-Attack [13] 2012 50 1,200 Frontal No Yes 2 1 0 0 0 3
CASIA-FASD [14] 2012 50 600 Frontal No No 1 1 0 0 0 2
3DMAD [15] 2013 17 255 Frontal No No 0 0 1 0 0 1
MSU-MFSD [16] 2015 35 440 Frontal No No 2 1 0 0 0 3
Replay-Mobile [17] 2016 40 1,030 Frontal No Yes 1 1 0 0 0 2
HKBU-MARs [18] 2016 35 1,009 Frontal No Yes 0 0 2 0 0 2
Oulu-NPU [19] 2017 55 4,950 Frontal No Yes 2 2 0 0 0 4
SiW [1] 2018 165 4,620 [−90◦, 90◦] Yes Yes 4 2 0 0 0 6
SiW-M [20] 2019 493 1,630 [−90◦, 90◦] Yes Yes 1 1 5 3 3 13
only on detecting 2D printed paper and video replay attacks,
and are vulnerable to spoofs crafted from materials not seen
during training of the dectector. In fact, studies show a two-
fold increase in error when spoof detectors encounter un-
known spoof types [1]. In addition, current face anti-spoofing
approaches rely on densely connected neural networks with
a large number of learnable parameters (exceeding 2.7M ),
where the lack of generalization across unknown spoof types
is even more pronounced.
b) Lack of Interpretability: Given a face image, face anti-
spoofing approaches typically output a holistic face “spoofness
score” which depicts the likelihood that the input image is live
or spoof. Without an ability to visualize which regions of the
face contribute to the overall decision made be the network,
the global spoofness score alone is not sufficient for a human
operator to interpret the network’s decision.
In an effort to impart generalizability and interpretability
to face spoof detection systems, we propose a face anti-
spoofing framework specifically designed to detect unknown
spoof types, namely, Self-Supervised Regional Fully Con-
volutional Network (SSR-FCN). A Fully Convolutional Net-
work (FCN) is first trained to learn global discriminative cues
and automatically identify spoof regions in face images. The
network is then fine-tuned to learn local representations via
regional supervision. Once trained, the deployed model can
automatically locate regions where spoofness occurs in the
input image and provide a final spoofness score.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We show that features learned from local face regions
have better generalization ability than those learned from
the entire face image alone.
• We provide extensive experiments to show that the
proposed approach, SSR-FCN, outperforms other local
region extraction strategies and state-of-the-art face anti-
spoofing methods on one of the largest publicly available
dataset, namely, SiW-M, comprised of 13 different spoof
types. The proposed method reduces the Equal Error
Rate (EER) by (i) 14% relative to state-of-the-art [21]
under the unknown attack setting, and (ii) 40% on known
spoofs. In addition, SSR-FCN achieves competitive per-
formance on standard benchmarks on Oulu-NPU [19]
dataset and outperforms prevailing methods on cross-
dataset generalization (CASIA-FASD [14] and Replay-
Attack [13]).
• The proposed SSR-FCN is also shown to be more inter-
pretable since it can directly predict which parts of the
faces are considered as spoofs.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to mitigate the threats associated with spoof at-
tacks, numerous face anti-spoofing techniques, based on both
software and hardware solutions, have been proposed. Early
software-based solutions utilized liveness cues, such as eye
blinking, lip movement, and head motion, to detect print
attacks [22–25]. However, these approaches fail when they
encounter unknown attacks such as printed attacks with cut
eye regions (see Figure 1n). In addition, these methods require
active cooperation of user in providing specific types of images
making them tedious to use.
Since then, researchers have moved on to passive face
anti-spoofing approaches that rely on texture analysis for
distinguishing lives and spoofs, rather than motion or liveness
cues. The majority of face anti-spoofing methods only focus on
detecting print and replay attacks, which can be detected using
features such as color and texture [26–31]. Many prior studies
employ handcrafted features such as 2D Fourier Spectrum [16,
32], Local Binary Patterns (LBP) [27, 33–35], Histogram of
oriented gradients (HOG) [26, 36], Difference-of-Gaussians
(DoG) [37], Scale-invariant feature transform (SIFT) [29], and
Speeded up robust features (SURF) [38]. Some techniques
utilize anti-spoofing beyond the RGB color spectrum, such as
incorporating the luminance and chrominance channels [35].
Instead of a predetermined color spectrum, Li et al. [28]
automatically learn a new color scheme that can best distin-
guish lives and spoofs. Another line of work extracts image
quality features to detect spoof faces [16, 30, 31]. Due to the
assumption that spoof types are one of replay or print attacks,
these methods severely suffer from generalization to unknown
spoof types.
Hardware-based solutions in literature have incorporated
3D depth information [39–41], multi-spectral and infrared
sensors [42], and even physiological sensors such as vein-flow
information [43]. Presentation attack detection can be further
enhanced by incorporating background audio signals [44].
However, with the inclusion of additional sensors along with a
standard camera, the deployment costs can be exorbitant (e.g.,
thermal sensors for iPhones cost over USD 4003).
State-of-the-art face anti-spoofing systems utilize Convolu-
tional Neural Networks (CNN) so the feature set (representa-
tion) is learned that best differentiates live faces from spoofs.
3https://amzn.to/2zJ6YW4
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Fig. 3. Illustration of drawbacks of prior approaches. (a) Top: example of a live face; Bottom: example of a paper glasses spoof. In this case, the spoof artifact
is only present in the eye-region of the face. (b) Classifier trained with global supervision overfits to the live class since both images are mostly live (the
spoof instrument covers only a part of the face). (c) Pixel-level supervision assumes the entire image is spoof or live and constructs label maps accordingly.
This is not a valid assumption in mask, makeup, and partial spoof types. Instead, (d) the proposed framework trains of extracted regions from face images.
These regions can be based on domain knowledge, such as eye, nose, mouth regions, or randomly cropped.
Yang et al. were among the first to propose CNNs for face
spoof detection and they showed about 70% decrease in Half
Total Error Rate (HTER) compared to the baselines com-
prised of handcrafted features [45]. Further improvement in
performance was achieved by directly modifying the network
architecture [46–49]. Deep learning approaches also perform
well for mask attack detection [7]. Incorporating auxiliary
information (e.g. eye blinking) in deep networks can further
improve the face spoof detection performance [1, 24].
Table I outlines the publicly available face anti-spoofing
datasets.
III. MOTIVATION
Our approach is motivated by following observations:
1) Face Anti-Spoofing is a Local Task: It is now generally
accepted that for print and replay attacks, “face spoofing
is usually a local task in which discriminative clues are
ubiquitous and repetitive” [50]. However, in the case of masks,
makeups, and partial attacks, the ubiquity and repetitiveness
of spoof cues may not hold true. For instance, in Figure 3
(a-c), spoofing artifact (the paper glasses) are only present
in the eye regions of the face. Unlike face recognition, face
anti-spoofing does not require the entire face image in order
to predict whether the image is a spoof or live. In fact, our
experimental results and their analysis will confirm that the
entire face image alone can adverserly affect the convergence
and generalization of networks.
2) Global vs. Local Supervision: Prior work can be parti-
tioned into two groups: (i) global supervision where the input
to the network is the entire face image and the CNN outputs a
score indicating whether the image is live or spoof [1, 21, 45–
49, 51, 52], and (ii) pixel-level supervision where multiple
classification losses are aggregated over each pixel in the
feature map [53, 54]. These studies assume that all pixels
in the face image is either live or spoof (see Figure 3(b)).
This assumption holds true for spoof types, such as replay
and print attacks (which are the only spoof types considered
by the studies), but not for mask, makeup, and partial attacks.
Therefore, pixel-level supervision can not only suffer from
TABLE II
ARCHITECTURE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED FCN BACKBONE.
Layer # of Activations # of Parameters
Input H ×W × 3 0
Conv H/2×W/2× 64 3× 3× 3× 64 + 64
Conv H/4×W/4× 128 3× 3× 64× 128 + 128
Conv H/8×W/8× 256 3× 3× 128× 256 + 256
Conv H/16×H/16× 512 3× 3× 256× 512 + 512
Conv H/16×H/16× 1 3× 3× 512× 1 + 1
GAP 1 0
Total 1.5M
Conv and GAP refer to convolutional and global average pooling operations.
poor generalization across a diverse range of spoof types, but
also convergence of the network is severely affected due to
noisy labels.
In summary, based on the 13 different spoof types shown in
Figure 1, for which we have the data, we gain the following in-
sights: (i) face anti-spoofing is inherently a local task, and (ii)
learning local representations can improve face anti-spoofing
performance [53, 54]. Motivated by (i), we hypothesize that
utilizing a Fully Convolutional Network (FCN) may be more
appropriate for the face anti-spoofing task compared to a
traditional CNN. The second insight suggests FCNs can be
intrinsically regularized to learn local cues by enforcing the
network to look at local spatial regions of the face. In order
to ensure that these regions mostly comprise spoof patterns,
we propose a self-supervised region extractor.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
In this section, we describe the proposed Self-Supervised
Regional Fully Convolutional Network (SSR-FCN) for gen-
eralized face anti-spoofing. As shown in Figure 2, we train
the network in two stages, (a) Stage I learns global dis-
criminative cues and predicts score maps, and (b) Stage II
extracts arbitrary-size regions from spoof areas and fine-tunes
the network via regional supervision.
5A. Network Architecture
In typical image classification tasks, networks are designed
such that information present in the input image can be used
for learning global discriminative features in the form of a
feature vector without utilizing the spatial arrangement in the
input. To this end, a fully connected (FC) layer is generally
introduced at the end of the last convolutional layer. The FC
layer is responsible for stripping away all spatial information
and reducing the feature maps into a single D-dimensional
feature vector. Given the plethora of available spoof types, it
is better to learn local representations and make decisions on
local spatial inputs rather than global descriptors. Therefore,
we employ a Fully Convolutional Network (FCN) by replacing
the FC layer in a traditional CNN with a 1× 1 convolutional
layer. This leads to three major advantages over traditional
CNNs:
• Arbitrary-sized inputs: The proposed FCN can accept
input images of any image size. This property can be
exploited to learn discriminative features at local spatial
regions, regardless of the input size, rather than overfitting
to a global representation of the entire face image.
• Interpretability: Since the proposed FCN is trained to
provide decisions at a local level, the score map output
by the network can be used to identify the spoof regions
in the face.
• Efficiency: Via FCN, an entire face image can be in-
ferred only once where local decisions are dynamically
aggregated via the 1× 1 convolution operator.
B. Network Efficiency
A majority of prior work on CNN-based face anti-spoofing
employs architectures that are densely connected with thir-
teen convolutional layers [1, 21, 52, 53, 55]. Even with
the placement of skip connections, the number of learnable
parameters exceed 2.7M . As we see in Table I, only a
limited amount of training data4 is generally available in face
anti-spoofing datasets. Limited data coupled with the large
number of trainable parameters causes current approaches
to overfit, leading to poor generalization performance under
unknown attack scenarios. Instead, we employ a shallower
neural network comprising of only five convolutional layers
with approximately 1.5M learnable parameters (see Table II).
C. Stage I: Training FCN Globally
We first train the FCN with global face images in order to
learn global discriminative cues and identify spoof regions in
the face image. Given an image, x ∈ RH×W×C , we detect
a face and crop the face region via 5 landmarks (two eyes,
nose, and two mouth keypoints) in order to remove background
information not pertinent to the task of face anti-spoofing.
Here, H , W , and C refer to the height, width, and number
of channels (3 in the case of RGB) of the input image. The
face regions are then aligned and resized to a fixed-size (e.g.,
4The lack of large-scale publicly available face anti-spoofing datasets is
due to the time and effort required along with privacy concerns associated in
acquiring such datasets.
256× 256) in order to maintain consistent spatial information
across all training data.
The proposed FCN consists of four downsampling convo-
lutional blocks each coupled with batch normalization and
ReLU activation. The feature map from the fourth convolu-
tional layer passes through a 1 × 1 convolutional layer. The
output of the 1 × 1 convolutional layer represents a score
map S ∈ R(HS×WS×1) where each pixel in S represents a
live/spoof decision corresponding to its receptive field in the
image. The height (HS) and width (WS) of the score map
is determined by the input image size and the number of
downsampling layers. For a 256 × 256 × 3 input image, our
proposed architecture outputs a 16× 16× 1 score map.
The score map is then reduced to a single scalar value by
globally average pooling. That is, the final classification score
(s) for an input image is obtained from the (HS ×WS × 1)
score map (S) by,
s =
1
HS ×WS
HS∑
i
WS∑
j
Si,j (1)
Using sigmoid activation on the final classification output (s),
we obtain a scalar p(c|x) ∈ [0, 1] predicting the likelihood
that the input image is a spoof, where c = 0 indicates live and
c = 1 indicates spoof.
We train the network by minimizing the Binary Cross
Entropy (BCE) loss,
L = − [y × log(p(c|x)) + (1− y)× log(1− p(c|x))] (2)
where y is the ground truth label of the input image.
D. Stage II: Training FCN on Self-Supervised Regions
In order to supervise training at a local level, we propose
a regional supervision strategy. We train the network to
learn local cues by only showing certain regions of the face
where spoof patterns exists. In order to ensure that spoof
artifacts/patterns indeed exists within the selected regions, the
pre-trained FCN from Stage I (IV-C) can automatically guide
the region selection process in spoof images. For live faces,
we can randomly crop a region from any part of the image.
Due to the absence of a fully connected layer, notice that
FCN naturally encodes decisions at each pixel in feature map
S. In other words, higher intensity pixels within S indicate
a larger likelihood of a spoof pattern residing within the
receptive field in the image. Therefore, discriminative regions
(spoof areas) are automatically highlighted in the score map
by training on entire face images (see Figure 2).
We can then craft a binary mask M indicating the live/spoof
regions in the input spoof images. First, we first soft-gate the
score map by min-max normalization such that we can obtain
a score map in [0, 1],
S′ =
(S−min(S))
(max(S)−min(S)) (3)
6Fig. 4. Three spoof images and their corresponding binary masks extracted from predicted score maps. Black regions correspond to predicted live regions,
whereas, white regions indicate spoofness.
Let fS′(i, j) represent the activation in the (i, j)-th spatial
location in the scaled score map S′. The binary mask M is
designed by hard-gating,
M(i, j) =
{
1, if S′(i, j) ≥ τ
0, otherwise
(4)
where, τ the size of the hard-gated region (τ = 0.5 in our
case). A larger τ will result in small regions and smaller τ
can lead to spurious spoof regions. Examples of binary masks
are shown in Figure 4. From the binary mask, we can then
randomly extract a rectangular bounding box such that the
center of the rectangle lies within the detected spoof regions.
In this manner, we can crop rectangular regions of arbitrary
sizes from the input image such that each region contains spoof
artifacts according to our pre-trained global FCN. We constrain
the width and height of the bounding boxes to be between
MINregion and MAXregion.
In this manner, we fine-tune our network to learn local
discriminative cues.
E. Testing
Since FCNs can accept abitrary input sizes and the fact that
the proposed FCN has encountered entire faces in Stage I, we
input the global face into the trained network and obtain the
score map. The score map is then average pooled to extract
the final classification output, which is then normalized by a
sigmoid function in order to obtain a spoofness score within
[0, 1]. That is, the final classification score is obtained by,
1
1 + exp(−s)
In addition to the classification score, the score map (S) can
also be utilized for visualizing the spoof regions in the face
by constructing a heatmap (see Figure 2).
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Datasets
The following four datasets are utilized in our study (Ta-
ble I):
1) Spoof-in-the-Wild with Multiple Attacks (SiW-M) [20]:
A dataset, collected in 2019, comprising 13 different types
of spoofs, acquired specifically for evaluating generalization
performance on unknown spoof types. Compared with other
publicly available datasets (Table I), SiW-M is diverse in spoof
attack types, environmental conditions, and face poses. We
evaluate SSR-FCN under both unknown and known settings,
and perform ablation studies on this dataset.
2) Oulu-NPU [19]: A dataset comprised of 4,950 high-
resolution video clips of 55 subjects. Oulu-NPU defines four
protocols each designed for evaluating generalization against
variations in capturing conditions, attack devices, capturing
devices and their combinations. We use this dataset for com-
paring our approach with the prevailing state-of-the-art face
anti-spoof methods on the four protocols.
3) CASIA-FASD [14] & Replay-Attack [13]: Both datasets,
collected in 2012, are frequently employed in face anti-
spoofing literature for testing cross-dataset generalization
performance. These two datasets provide a comprehensive
collection of attacks, including warped photo attacks, cut
photo attacks, and video replay attacks. Low-quality, normal-
quality,and high-quality videos are recorded under different
lighting conditions.
emphAll images shown in this paper are from SiW-M testing
sets.
B. Data Preprocessing
For all datasets, we first extract all frames in a video. The
frames are then passed through MTCNN face detector [56]
to detect 5 facial landmarks (two eyes, nose and two mouth
corners). Similarity transformation is used to align the face
images based on the five landmarks. After transformation, the
images are cropped to 256×256. All face images shown in the
paper are cropped and aligned. Before passing into network,
we normalize the images by requiring each pixel to be within
[−1, 1] by subtracting 127.5 and dividing by 128.0.
C. Implementation Details
SSR-FCN is implemented in Tensorflow, and trained with
a constant learning rate of (1e − 3) with a mini-batch size
of 128. The objective function, L, is minimized using Adam
optimizer [57]. It takes 20 epochs to converge. Following [1],
we randomly initialize all the weights of the convolutional
layers using a normal distribution of 0 mean and 0.02 standard
deviation. We restrict the self-supervised regions to be at least
1/4 of the entire image, that is, MINregion = 64 and at
most MAXregion = 256 which is the size of the global face
image. Data augmentation during training involves random
horizontal flips with a probability of 0.5. For evaluation, we
compute the spoofness scores for all frames in a video and
temporally average them to obtain the final classification score.
For all experiments, we use a threshold of 0.5 as our live/spoof
decision threshold.
7TABLE III
GENERALIZATION ERROR (EER %) ON LEARNING GLOBAL (CNN) VS.
LOCAL (FCN) REPRESENTATIONS OF SIW-M [20].
Method Replay Obfuscation Paper Glasses Overall
CNN 12.8 44.6 23.6 27.0 ± 13.2
FCN 11.2 37.6 12.4 20.4 ± 12.1
D. Evaluation Metrics
There is no standard metric used in literature for evaluating
face spoof detection and each dataset provides their own
evaluation protocol. For a fair comparison with prior work,
we report the Average Classification Error Rate (ACER)
(standardized in ISO/IEC 30107 [3]), Equal Error Rate (EER),
and True Detection Rate (TDR) at 2.0%5 False Detection Rate
(FDR) for our evaluation.
Given a confusion matrix with the number of True Positives
(TP ), True Negatives (TN ), False Positives (FP ), and False
Negatives (FN ), we first define the Attack Presentation Clas-
sification Error Rate (APCER) and the Bonafide Presentation
Classification Error Rate (BPCER)6 as,
APCER =
FN
FN + TP
, (5)
BPCER =
FP
FP + TN
(6)
The ACER is then computed by,
ACER =
max
k=1...C
(APCERk) +BPCER
2
(7)
where C is the number of spoof types (provided in Table I).
The Equal Error Rate is the error defined at a threshold
where both False Detection Rate and False Rejection Rate
is minimal. For cross-dataset evaluation, the Half Total Error
Rate (HTER) is used,
HTER =
FDR+ FRR
2
(8)
E. Evaluation of Global Descriptor vs. Local Representation
In order to analyze the impact of learning local embeddings
as opposed to learning a global embedding, we conduct an
ablation study on three spoof types in the SiW-M dataset [20],
namely, Replay (Figure 1c), Obfuscation (Figure 1i), and Paper
Glasses (Figure 1m).
In this experiment, a traditional CNN learning a global
image descriptor is constructed by replacing the 1 × 1 con-
volutional layer with a fully connected layer. We compare the
CNN to the proposed backbone FCN in Table II which learns
local representations. For a fair comparison between CNN and
FCN, we utilize the same meta-parameters and employ global
supervision only (Stage I).
5Due to the small number of live samples, thresholds at lower False
Detection Rate (FDR) such as 0.2% (recommended under the IARPA ODIN
program) cannot be computed.
6APCER corresponds to the worst error rate among the spoof types (akin
to False Rejection Rate) and the BPCER is the error in classifying lives as
spoofs (akin to False Detection Rate).
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In Table III, we find that overall FCNs are more general-
izable to unknown spoof types compared to global embed-
dings. For spoof types where spoof affects the entire face,
such as replay attacks, the differences between generalization
performance of CNN and FCN are negligible. Here, spoof
decisions at local spatial regions does not have any significant
advantage over a single spoof decision over the entire image.
Recall that CNNs employ a fully connected layer which strips
away all spatial information. This explains why local decisions
can significantly improve generalizability of FCN over CNN
when spoof types are local in nature (e.g., make-up attacks
and partial attacks). Due to subtlety of obfuscation attacks and
localized nature of paper glasses, FCN can exhibit a relative
reduction in EER by 16% and 47%, respectively, relative to
CNN.
F. Region Extraction Strategies
We considered 5 different region extraction strategies,
namely, Eye-Region, Nose-Region, Mouth-Region, Landmark-
Region, and Self-Supervised Regions (Proposed) (see Fig-
ure 5). Here, Global refers to training the FCN with the entire
face image only (Stage I).
Since all face images are aligned and cropped, spatial infor-
mation is consistent across all images in datasets. Therefore,
we can automatically extract facial regions that inclue eye,
nose, and mouth regions (Figure 5a). We train the proposed
FCN separately on each of the three regions to obtain three
models: eye-region, nose-region, and mouth-region.
8TABLE IV
GENERALIZATION PERFORMANCE OF DIFFERENT REGION EXTRACTION STRATEGIES ON SIW-M DATASET. HERE, EACH COLUMN REPRESENTS AN
UNKNOWN SPOOF TYPE WHILE THE METHOD IS TRAINED ON THE REMAINING 12 SPOOF TYPES.
Method Metric (%)
Replay Print Mask Attacks Makeup Attacks Partial Attacks
Mean ± Std.
Replay Print Half Silicone Trans. Paper Mann. Obf. Imp. Cosm. FunnyEye Glasses Paper Cut
99 vids. 118 vids. 72 vids. 27 vids. 88 vids. 17 vids. 40 vids. 23 vids. 61 vids. 50 vids. 160 vids. 127 vids. 86 vids.
Global
ACER 11.2 15.5 12.8 21.5 35.4 6.1 10.7 52.2 50.0 20.5 26.2 12.1 9.6 22.6 ± 15.3
EER 11.2 14.0 12.8 23.1 26.6 2.9 11.0 37.6 10.4 17.0 24.2 12.4 10.1 16.8 ± 9.3
Eye-Region
ACER 13.2 13.7 7.5 17.4 22.5 5.79 6.2 19.5 8.3 11.7 32.8 15.3 7.3 13.2 ± 8.5
EER 12.4 11.4 7.3 15.2 21.5 2.9 6.5 20.2 7.8 11.2 27.2 14.7 7.5 12.3 ± 6.2
Nose-Region
ACER 17.4 10.5 8.2 13.8 30.3 5.3 8.4 37.4 5.1 18.0 35.5 31.4 7.1 17.6 ± 12.0
EER 14.6 9.8 9.2 12.7 22.0 5.2 8.4 23.6 4.4 14.6 24.9 27.7 7.6 14.2 ± 7.9
Mouth-Region
ACER 20.5 20.7 22.9 26.3 30.6 15.6 17.1 44.2 18.1 24.0 38.0 47.2 8.5 25.7 ± 11.4
EER 19.9 21.3 22.6 25.1 30.0 10.1 10.7 40.9 16.1 24.0 35.5 40.4 8.1 23.4 ± 10.9
Global + Eye + Nose
ACER 10.9 10.5 7.5 17.7 28.7 5.1 7.0 38.0 5.1 13.6 29.4 15.2 6.2 15 ± 10.7
EER 10.2 10.0 7.7 15.8 21.3 1.8 6.7 21.0 3.0 12.3 22.5 12.3 6.5 11.6 ± 6.8
Landmark-Region
ACER 10.7 9.2 18.4 25.1 26.4 6.2 6.9 53.8 8.1 15.4 35.8 40.8 7.6 20.3 ± 15.2
EER 8.0 10.1 12.2 23.1 18.8 8.9 4.1 40.1 9.9 15.6 17.7 25.6 4.9 15.3 ± 10
Global + Landmark
ACER 12.0 11.2 7.3 23.7 26.4 6.3 5.9 26.7 6.7 10.7 27.8 25.7 6.4 15.1 ± 9.2
EER 11.5 10.1 7.2 19.0 4.9 6.6 4.6 25.6 6.7 10.9 23.5 18.5 4.7 11.8 ± 7.4
Self-Sup. (Proposed)
ACER 7.4 19.5 3.2 7.7 33.3 5.2 3.3 22.5 5.9 11.7 21.7 14.1 6.4 12.4 ± 9.2
EER 6.8 11.2 2.8 6.3 28.5 0.4 3.3 17.8 3.9 11.7 21.6 13.5 3.6 10.1 ± 8.4
We also investigate extracting regions defined by face
landmarks. For this, we utilize a state-of-the-art landmark
extractor, namely DLIB [58], to obtain 51 landmark points
around eyebrows, eyes, nose, and mouth. A total of 51 regions
(with a fixed size 32×32) centered around each landmark are
extracted and used train a single FCN on all 51 regions.
Our findings are as follows: (i) almost all methods with
regional supervision have lower overall error rates as compared
to training with the entire face. Exception to this is when FCN
is trained only on mouth regions. This is likely because a
majority of spoof types may not contain spoof patterns across
mouth regions (Figure 1). (ii) when both global and domain-
knowledge strategies (specifically, eyes and nose) are fused,
the generalization performance improves compared to the
global model alone. Note that we do not fuse the mouth region
since the performance is poor for mouth regions. Similarly,
we find that regions cropped around landmarks when fused
with the global classifier can achieve better generalization
performance. (iii) compared to all region extraction strategies,
the proposed self-supervised region extraction strategy (Stage
II) achieves the lowest generalization error rates across all
spoof types with a 40% and 45% relative reduction in EER and
ACER compared to the Global model (Stage I). This supports
our hypothesis that both Stage I and Stage II are required for
enhanced generalization performance across unknown spoof
types. A score-level fusion of the global FCN with self-
supervised regions does not show any significant reduction
in error rates. This is because we already trained the proposed
FCN on global faces in Stage I.
In Figure 6, we analyze the effect of training the FCN
locally vs. globally on the prediction results. In the first row,
where both models correctly predict the input to be a spoof,
we see that FCN trained via random regions can correctly
identify spoof regions such as fake eyebrows. In contrast, the
global FCN can barely locate the fake eyebrows. Since random
(a) Obfuscation (b) Spoofness Score: 1.0 (c) Spoofness Score: 0.7
(d) Obfuscation (e) Spoofness Score: 0.0 (f) Spoofness Score: 0.0
Fig. 6. (a) An example obfuscation spoof attempt where our network correctly
predicts the input to be a spoof. (b, e) Score map output by our network trained
via Self-Supervised Regions. (c, f) Score map output by FCN trained on entire
face images. (d) An example obfuscation spoof attempt where our network
incorrectly predicts the input to be a live. Spoofness scores are given below
the spoof maps. Decision threshold is 0.5.
TABLE V
GENERALIZATION ERROR (EER %) OF FCNS WITH RESPECT TO THE
NUMBER OF TRAINABLE PARAMETERS.
Method Replay Obfuscation Paper Glasses Mean ± Std.
3-layers (76K) 14.0 44.1 7.5 28.5 ± 12.3
5-layers (1.5M ; proposed) 6.8 17.8 23.6 12.7 ± 4.5
6-layers (3M ) 7.8 25.19 19.7 17.6 ± 7.2
regions increases the variability in the training set along with
advantage of learning local features than global FCN, we find
that proposed self-supervised regional supervision performs
9TABLE VI
RESULTS ON SIW-M: UNKNOWN ATTACKS. HERE, EACH COLUMN REPRESENTS AN UNKNOWN SPOOF TYPE WHILE THE METHOD IS TRAINED ON THE
REMAINING 12 SPOOF TYPES.
Method Metric
Replay Print Mask Attacks Makeup Attacks Partial Attacks
Mean ± Std.
Replay Print Half Silicone Trans. Paper Mann. Obf. Imp. Cosm. FunnyEye Glasses Paper Cut
99 vids. 118 vids. 72 vids. 27 vids. 88 vids. 17 vids. 40 vids. 23 vids. 61 vids. 50 vids. 160 vids. 127 vids. 86 vids.
SVM+LBP [19]
ACER 20.6 18.4 31.3 21.4 45.5 11.6 13.8 59.3 23.9 16.7 35.9 39.2 11.7 26.9 ± 14.5
EER 20.8 18.6 36.3 21.4 37.2 7.5 14.1 51.2 19.8 16.1 34.4 33.0 7.9 24.5 ± 12.9
Auxiliary [1]
ACER 16.8 6.9 19.3 14.9 52.1 8.0 12.8 55.8 13.7 11.7 49.0 40.5 5.3 23.6 ± 18.5
EER 14.0 4.3 11.6 12.4 24.6 7.8 10.0 72.3 10.1 9.4 21.4 18.6 4.0 17.0 ± 17.7
DTN [20]
ACER 9.8 6.0 15.0 18.7 36.0 4.5 7.7 48.1 11.4 14.2 19.3 19.8 8.5 16.8 ± 11.1
EER 10.0 2.1 14.4 18.6 26.5 5.7 9.6 50.2 10.1 13.2 19.8 20.5 8.8 16.1 ± 12.2
CDC [21]
ACER 10.8 7.3 9.1 10.3 18.8 3.5 5.6 42.1 0.8 14.0 24.0 17.6 1.9 12.7 ± 11.2
EER 9.2 5.6 4.2 11.1 19.3 5.9 5.0 43.5 0.0 14.0 23.3 14.3 0.0 11.9 ± 11.8
Proposed
ACER 7.4 19.5 3.2 7.7 33.3 5.2 3.3 22.5 5.9 11.7 21.7 14.1 6.4 12.4 ± 9.2
EER 6.8 11.2 2.8 6.3 28.5 0.4 3.3 17.8 3.9 11.7 21.6 13.5 3.6 10.1 ± 8.4
TDR* 72.0 51.0 96.0 55.9 39.0 100.0 95.0 31.0 90.0 44.0 33.0 42.9 94.7 65.0 ± 25.9
*TDR evaluated at 2.0% FDR
TABLE VII
RESULTS ON SIW-M: KNOWN SPOOF TYPES.
Method Metric (%) Mask Attacks Makeup Attacks Partial Attacks Mean ± Std.
Replay Print Half Silicone Trans. Paper Mann. Obf. Imp. Cosm. Funny Eye Glasses Paper Cut
Auxiliary [1]
ACER 5.1 5.0 5.0 10.2 5.0 9.8 6.3 19.6 5.0 26.5 5.5 5.2 5.0 8.7 ± 6.8
EER 4.7 0.0 1.6 10.5 4.6 10.0 6.4 12.7 0.0 19.6 7.2 7.5 0.0 6.5 ± 5.8
Proposed
ACER 3.5 3.1 1.9 5.7 2.1 1.9 4.2 7.2 2.5 22.5 1.9 2.2 1.9 4.7 ± 5.6
EER 3.5 3.1 0.1 9.9 1.4 0.0 4.3 6.4 2.0 15.4 0.5 1.6 1.7 3.9 ± 4.4
TDR* 55.5 92.3 69.5 100.0 90.4 100.0 85.1 92.5 78.7 99.1 95.6 95.7 76.0 87.0 ± 13.0
*TDR evaluated at 2.0% FDR
best.
G. Evaluation of Network Capacity
In Table V, we plot the generalization performance of
our model when we vary the capacity of the network. We
consider three different variants of the proposed FCN: (a)
3-layer FCN (76K parameters), (b) 5-layer FCN (1.5 pa-
rameters; proposed), and (c) 6-layer FCN (3M parameters).
This experiment is evaluated on three unknown spoof types,
namely, Replay, Obfuscation, and Paper Glasses. We chose
these spoof types due to their vastly diverse nature. Replay
attacks consist of global spoof patters, whereas obfuscation
attacks are extremely subtle cosmetic changes. Paper Glasses
are constrained only to eyes. While to many trainable parame-
ters leads to poor generalization due to overfitting to the spoof
types seen during training, whereas, too few parameters limits
learning discriminative features. Based on this observation and
experimental results, we utilize the 5-layer FCN (see Table II)
with approximately 1.5M parameters. A majority of prior
studies employ 13 densely connected convolutional layers with
trainable parameters exceeding 2.7M [1, 21, 53, 54].
H. Generalization across Unknown Attacks
The primary objective of this work is to enhance generaliza-
tion performance across a multitude of unknown spoof types
in order to effectively gauge the expected error rates in real-
world scenarios. The evaluation protocol in SiW-M follows a
leave-one-spoof-out testing protocol where the training split
contains 12 different spoof types and the 13th spoof type is
held out for testing. Among the live videos, 80% are kept
in the training set and the remaining 20% is used for testing
lives. Note that there are no overlapping subjects between the
training and testing sets. Also note that no data sample from
the testing spoof type is used for validation since we evaluate
our approach under unknown attacks. We report ACER and
EER across the 13 splits. In addition to ACER and EER, we
also report the TDR at 2.0% FDR.
In Table VI, we compare SSR-FCN with prior work. We find
that our proposed method achieves significant improvement in
comparison to the published results [21] (relative reduction of
14% on the average EER and 3% on the average ACER). Note
that the standard deviation across all 13 spoof types is also
reduced compared to prior approaches, even though some of
them [1, 21] utilize auxiliary data such as depth and temporal
information.
Specifically, we reduce the EERs of replay, half mask,
transparent mask, silicone mask, paper mask, mannequin head,
obfuscation, impersonation, and paper glasses relatively by
27%, 33%, 43%, 93%, 34%, 59%, and 6%, respectively.
Among all the 13 spoof types, detecting obfuscation attacks
is the most challenging. This is due to the fact that the
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TABLE VIII
ERROR RATES (%) OF THE PROPOSED SSR-FCN AND AND COMPETING
FACE SPOOF DETECTORS UNDER THE FOUR STANDARD PROTOCOLS OF
OULU-NPU [19].
Protocol Method APCER BPCER ACER
I
GRADIENT [59] 1.3 12.5 6.9
Auxiliary [1] 1.6 1.6 1.6
DeepPixBiS [53] 0.8 0.0 0.4
TSCNN-ResNet [60] 5.1 6.7 5.9
SSR-FCN (Proposed) 1.5 7.7 4.6
II
GRADIENT [59] 3.1 1.9 2.5
Auxiliary [1] 2.7 2.7 2.7
DeepPixBiS [53] 11.4 0.6 6.0
TSCNN-ResNet [60] 7.6 2.2 4.9
SSR-FCN (Proposed) 3.1 3.7 3.4
III
GRADIENT [59] 2.1 ± 3.9 5.0± 5.3 3.8± 2.4
Auxiliary [1] 2.7± 1.3 3.1± 1.7 2.9± 1.5
DeepPixBiS [53] 11.7± 19.6 10.6± 14.1 11.1± 9.4
TSCNN-ResNet [60] 3.9± 2.8 7.3± 1.1 5.6± 1.6
SSR-FCN (Proposed) 2.9 ± 2.1 2.7 ± 3.2 2.8 ± 2.2
IV
GRADIENT [59] 5.0 ± 4.5 15.0± 7.1 10.0± 5.0
Auxiliary [1] 9.3± 5.6 10.4± 6.0 9.5 ± 6.0
DeepPixBiS [53] 36.7± 29.7 13.3± 16.8 25.0± 12.7
TSCNN-ResNet [60] 11.3± 3.9 9.7 ± 4.8 9.8± 4.2
SSR-FCN (Proposed) 8.3± 6.8 13.3± 8.7 10.8± 5.1
makeup applied in these attacks are very subtle and majority
of the faces are live. Prior works were not successful in
detectint these attacks and predict most of the obfuscation
attacks as lives. By learning discriminative features locally,
our proposed network improves the state-of-the-art obfuscation
attack detection performance by 59% in terms of EER and
46% in terms of ACER.
I. SiW-M: Detecting Known Attacks
Here all the 13 spoof types in SiW-M are used for training
as well as testing. We randomly split the SiW-M dataset
into a 60%-40% training/testing split and report the results
in Table VII. In comparison to a state-of-the-art face anti-
spoofing method [1], our method outperforms for almost all
of the individual spoof types as well as the overall performance
across spoof types. Auxiliary [1] utilizes depth and temporal
information for spoof detection which adds significant com-
plexity to the network.
J. Evaluation on Oulu-NPU Dataset
We follow the four standard protocols defined in
the OULU-NPU dataset [19] which cover the cross-
background, cross-presentation-attack-instrument (cross-PAI),
cross-capture-device, and cross-conditions evaluations:
• Protocol I: unseen subjects, illumination, and back-
grounds;
• Protocol II: unseen subjects and attack devices;
• Protocol III: unseen subjects and cameras;
• Protocol IV: unseen subjects, illumination, backgrounds,
attack devices, and cameras.
TABLE IX
CROSS-DATASET HTER (%) OF THE PROPOSED SSR-FCN AND
COMPETING FACE SPOOF DETECTORS.
Method CASIA → Replay Replay → CASIA
CNN [45] 48.5 45.5
Color Texture [35] 47.0 49.6
Auxiliary [1] 27.6 28.4
De-Noising [50] 28.5 41.1
STASN [61] 31.5 30.9
SAPLC [54] 27.3 37.5
SSR-FCN (Proposed) 19.9 41.9
“CASIA → Replay” denotes training on CASIA and testing on Replay-
Attack
We compare the proposed SSR-FCN with the best perform-
ing method, namely GRADIENT [59], in IJCB Mobile Face
Anti-Spoofing Competition [59] for each protocol. We also
include some newer baseline methods, including Auxiliary [1],
DeepPixBiS [53], and TSCNN [60]. We compare our proposed
method with 10 baselines in total for each protocol. Additional
baselines can be found in supplementary material.
In Table VIII, SSR-FCN achieves ACERs of 4.6%, 3.4%,
2.8%, and 10.8% in the four protocols, respectively. Among
the baselines, SSR-FCN even outperforms prevailing state-of-
the-art methods in protocol III which corresponds to gen-
eralization performance for unseen subjects and cameras.
The results are comparable to baseline methods in the other
three protocols. Since Oulu-NPU comprises of only print and
replay attacks, a majority of the baseline methods incorporate
auxiliary information such as depth and motion. Indeed, in-
corporating auxiliary information could improve the results at
the risk of overfitting and overhead cost and time.
K. Cross-Dataset Generalization
In order to evaluate the generalization performance of SSR-
FCN when trained on one dataset and tested on another,
following prior studies, we perform a cross-dataset experiment
between CASIA-FASD [14] and Replay-Attack [13].
In Table IX, we find that, compared to 6 prevailing state-of-
the-art methods, the proposed SSR-FCN achieves the lowest
error (a 27% improvement in HTER) when trained on CASIA-
FASD [14] and evaluated on Replay-Attack [13]. On the other
hand, SSR-FCN achieves worse performance when trained
on Replay-Attack and tested on CASIA-FASD. This can
likely be attributed to higher resolution images in CASIA-
FASD compared to Replay-Attack. This demonstrates that
SSR-FCN trained with higher-resolution data can generalize
better on poorer quality testing images, but the reverse may
not hold true. We intend on addressing this limitation in future
work.
Additional baselines can be found in supplementary mate-
rial.
L. Failure Cases
Even though experiment results show enhanced generaliza-
tion performance, our model still fails to correctly classify
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(a) Misclassified Lives as Spoofs
(b) Misclassified Spoofs as Lives
Fig. 7. Example cases where the proposed framework, SSR-FCN, fails to
correctly classify lives and spoofs. (a) Lives are misclassified as spoofs likely
due to bright lighting and occlusions in face regions. (b) Spoofs misclassified
as lives due to the subtle nature of make-up attacks and transparent masks.
Corresponding spoofness scores (∈ [0, 1]) are provided below each image.
Larger value of spoofness score indicates a higher likelihood that the input
image is a spoof. Decision threshold is 0.5.
certain input images. In Figure 7, we show a few such
examples.
Figure 7a shows incorrect prediction of lives as spoofs in the
presence of inhomogeneous illumination. This is because the
model predicts lives as being one of replay and print attacks
which exhibit bright lighting patterns due to the recapturing
media such as smartphones and laptops. Since we fine-tune our
network via regional supervision in Stage II, artifacts which
obstruct parts of the faces can also adversely affect our model.
Figure 7b shows incorrect classification of spoofs as lives.
This is particularly true when suffers when spoof patterns are
very subtle, such as cosmetic and obfuscation make-up attacks.
Transparent masks can also be problematic when the mask
itself is barely visible.
M. Computational Requirement
Since face anti-spoofing modules are employed as a pre-
processing step for automated face recognition systems, it is
crucial that the spoof prediction time should be as low as
possible. The proposed SSR-FCN takes under 2 hours to train
both Stage I and Stage II, and 4 miliseconds to predict a
single (256×256) spoof/live image on a Nvidia GTX 1080Ti
GPU. In other words, SSR-FCN can process frames at 250
Frames Per Second (FPS) and the size of the model is only
11.8MB. Therefore, SSR-FCN is well suited for deployment
on embedded devices such as smartphones.
N. Visualizing Spoof Regions
SSR-FCN can automatically locate the individual spoof
regions in an input face image. In Figure 8, we show heatmaps
from the score maps extracted for a randomly chosen image
from all spoof types. Red regions indicate a higher likelihood
of spoof.
For a live input image, the spoof regions are sparse with
low likelihoods. In the case of replay and print attacks, the
predicted spoof regions are located throughout the entire face
image. This is because these spoofs contain global-level noise.
For mask attacks, including half-mask, silicone mask, transpar-
ent mask, paper mask, and mannequin, the spoof patterns are
identified near the eye and nose regions. Make-up attacks are
harder to detect since they are very subtle in nature. Proposed
SSR-FCN detects obfuscation and cosmetic attack attempts by
learning local discriminative cues around the eyebrow regions.
In contrast, impersonation make-up patterns exist throughout
the entire face. We also find that SSR-FCN can precisely locate
the spoofing artifacts, such as funny eyeglasses, paper glasses,
and paper cut, in partial attacks.
VI. DISCUSSION
We show that the proposed SSR-FCN achieves superior
generalization performance on SiW-M dataset [20] compared
to the prevailing state-of-the-art methods that tend to overfit on
the seen spoof types. Our method also achieves comparable
performance to the state-of-the-art in Oulu-NPU dataset[19]
and outperforms all baselines for cross-dataset generalization
performance (CASIA-FASD [14] → Replay-Attack [13]).
In contrast to a number of prior studies [1, 21, 35, 52],
the proposed approach does not utilize auxiliary cues for
spoof detection, such as motion and depth information. While
incorporating such cues may enhance performance on print
and replay attack datasets such as Oulu-NPU, CASIA-MFSD,
and Replay-Attack, it is at the risk of potentially overfitting
to the two attacks and compute cost. A major benefit of SSR-
FCN lies is its usability. A simple pre-processing step includes
face detection and alignment. The cropped face is then passed
to the network. With a single forward-pass through the FCN,
we obtain both the score map and the spoofness score.
Even though the proposed method is well-suited for gen-
eralizable face anti-spoofing, SSR-FCN is still limited by the
amount and quality of available training data. For instance,
when trained on a low-resolution dataset, namely Replay-
Attack [13], cross-dataset generalization performance suffers.
VII. CONCLUSION
Face anti-spoofing systems are crucial for secure operation
of an automated face recognition system. With the introduction
of sophisticated spoofs, such as high resolution and tight
fitting silicone 3D face masks, spoof detectors need to be
robust and generalizable. We proposed a face anti-spoofing
framework, namely SSR-FCN, that achieved state-of-the-art
generalization performance against 13 different spoof types.
SSR-FCN reduced the average error rate of competitive algo-
rithms by 14% on one of the largest and most diverse face
anti-spoofing dataset, SiW-M, comprised of 13 spoof types.
It also generalizes well when training and testing datasets
are from different sources. In addition, the proposed method
is shown to be more interpretable compared to prior studies
since it can directly predict which parts of the faces are
considered as spoofs. In the future, we intend on exploring
whether incorporating domain knowledge in SSR-FCN can
further improve generalization performance.
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Live Replay Print Half-Mask Silicone Mask Trans. Mask Paper Mask
Mannequin Obfuscation Impersonation Cosmetic FunnyEye Paper Glasses Paper Cut
Fig. 8. Visualizing spoof regions via the proposed SSR-FCN. Red regions indicate higher likelihood of being a spoof region. Corresponding spoofness scores
(∈ [0, 1]) are provided below each image. Larger value of spoofness score indicates a higher likelihood that the input image is a spoof. Decision threshold is
0.5.
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